inheritance mechanism unifies explanations of transmission and epigenesis so well. However, the degree of our understanding of one inheritance mechanism, system, or process, should not blind us to the possible existence of others or lead to the mistaken conclusion that what we understand well is thereby that which is most significant in nature.
A variety of evidence and arguments suggest that: (1) systems of inheritance besides the familiar nucleic acid system exist; (2) while typically of lower fidelity than the nucleic acid system, epigenetic inheritance systems (EISs) can nevertheless cause heritabilities greater than zero; and (3) epigenetic mechanisms may be of some significance in evolutionary dynamics through effects on (a) ''epigenesis,'' which may structure the genotype-phenotype mapping in an environment-dependent way, and (b) transmission in cases where epigenetic states can be stably transmitted through the germ-line for up to tens or even hundreds of generations (Jablonka and Lamb, 1995) .
Inheritance systems can be understood most generally as a class of reproduction processes. Reproduction is a process ranging over life cycles in which new entities (1) are produced from parts of old entities -they ''overlap materially' ' -and (2) are created with the capacity to develop because parts transferred to them are mechanisms for acquiring the capacity to reproduce. Inheritance systems are reproduction processes in which mechanisms for specific kinds of development (acquisition of the capacity to reproduce) have evolved. Genetic systems are best interpreted as a special class of inheritance systems in which the transferable mechanisms of development are ''coding'' mechanisms conferring developmental capacities by means of high-fidelity, reliable, ''digital'' properties familiar from our knowledge of the nucleic acid inheritance system. This view of inheritance processes combined with evidence for the existence of EISs supports a form of argument for the evolutionary significance of EISs that parallels certain arguments for group selection.
Epigenetic inheritance is significant in e6olution
Many interesting empirical and theoretical questions are raised by Jablonka and Lamb's paper. My interest is in the form of their argument that epigenetic inheritance is significant in evolution. While accepting the Darwinian basis of adaptive evolution in natural selection of heritable differences among individuals, they reinterpret heritable differences in terms of multiple systems of inheritance, including several epigenetic systems in addition to the familiar genetic system. Ultimately, the defense of Jablonka and Lamb's conclusion depends on interpreting evolution as a process in which inheritance, development, and selection are integrated into life cycles producing reproduction processes. Their theory of epigenetic inheritance suggests that this integration will not be the result of a reduction of epigenetic development to developmental genetics. Instead, a conception of a hierarchy of reproduction processes is needed to interpret each level of process in terms of both inheritance and development at that level. The best available model of an evolutionary process hierarchy is the transition model for the evolutionary origin of new levels of organization (Buss, 1987; Maynard Smith and Szathmáry, 1995) , provided that the units of transition are interpreted as ''reproducers'' rather than Dawkins-Hull ''replicators'' (Griesemer, in press ). Evolution at a transition level, then, is the result of selection (or other biasing force) in combination with reproduction at that level.
Whether inheritance at a level is realized through a ''genetic'' system with high-fidelity coding, a lower fidelity EIS, or a complex of inheritance systems of different types, will determine the nature of the evolutionary dynamics at that level and will also influence selective forces and reproductive interactions among levels. The evolutionary significance of epigenetic inheritance thus turns on how one interprets hierarchical evolution. It also turns on how one understands evolutionary significance, which requires a careful consideration of the form of the argument Jablonka and Lamb have offered.
Establishing this significance is important because all three classes of EISssteady state metabolic, structural, and chromatin-marking systems -are responsive to environmental change in ways and on time scales that genetic mutations are not and also because epigenetic systems may interact with the genetic system. For both these reasons, evolutionary dynamics can be more complex than genetic models suggest and may possibly diverge from the predictions of purely genetic models. Preliminary epigenetics modeling (with zero genetic variance) thus far indicates potential evolutionary significance (Jablonka et al., 1992; Jablonka and Lamb, 1995, ch 8; Jablonka et al., 1995; Kisdi and Jablonka, in prep.) . However, models of multiple inheritance applied to specific empirical and experimental systems are needed to go beyond these preliminary ''proofs of concept'' in order to show that phenomena recalcitrant to explanation in genetic terms are better explained in epigenetic terms, as Jablonka and Lamb suggest for the evolution of development, genome organization, post-mating reproductive isolation, and Haldane's rule.
The argument that epigenetic inheritance is significant in evolution depends on the relationship between claims of the existence of epigenetic systems, their capacity to support evolutionary change, and their potential responsibility for actual evolutionary change in nature. These requirements suggest two different senses of ''evolutionary significance.'' Confusion of these obscures the form of the argument and also its value as a spur to further work. Recent opinion suggests that only evolutionary phenomena that are relatively frequent in nature are significant and that alternatives to adaptive evolution due to natural selection might be acknowledged to exist (in low frequency) but be dismissed as insignificant explanations in general because of their low frequency (see Gould and Lewontin, 1978) . This view assumes that low frequency alternatives would at best have theoretical but not empirical significance and therefore that they would have no scientific significance at all. A contrasting view of the problem distinguishes significance for general theoretical and particular empirical purposes in terms of explanations which ''get the causes right'' even if they are relatively infrequent.
A phenomenon that occurs only infrequently, or that plays a frequent but minor direct casual role can be theoretically significant if its representation in models is necessary to get long-term dynamics right. Since evolution can amplify small per-generation effects, even minor causes can have major consequences. If epigenetic systems that are responsive to local environments modify the morphologies of organisms in ontogeny, they can also alter selection pressures acting to change allele frequencies. So even if epigenetic ''memory'' lasts only up to tens of generations, interaction with the genetic system might result in much longer-term evolutionary consequences through indirect effects of epimutation on genetic selection regimes. The modeling assumption that inheritance is purely genetic, therefore, may be an adequate idealization only for the short term. Similar criticisms were made of the use of idealizing Gaussian assumptions for the distribution of breeding values in quantitative evolutionary genetic models. These do not go very far wrong in predicting population mean and additive genetic variance from phenotypes over a few generations, but long term evolution can diverge considerably (in proportion to the variance effective number of loci) from infinitesimal model predictions (Turelli, 1988; Barton and Turelli, 1989) .
In sum, the argument that epigenetic inheritance is significant in evolution rests not with evidence of its relatively high frequency of contribution in nature, but rather with potential efficacy to cause deviation from genetic predictions of evolutionary dynamics. (Note this does not require that genetic and epigenetic change be opposed in direction.) Two things are required to demonstrate potential efficacy in evolution: evidence of the existence of EISs and evidence that multiple inheritance systems are capable of divergence from evolutionary genetic predictions. Satisfaction of these requirements should be enough to make theoretical models of evolution with multiple inheritance pursuit-worthy regardless of the relative frequency of large direct epigenetic effects in nature. Theoretically, the existence and competence of epigenetic causes in evolution are significant because they imply EISs are potential true causes of evolution: they must be empirically ruled out as non-explanatory in order to justify continuing in the single inheritance system explanatory mode.
To be empirically as well as theoretically significant, there must be independent evidence that EISs are actually responsible for cases of evolution in nature. This claim does not require, however, that there be evolution at the ''epigenetic level,'' although that is a possibility that should not be ignored. Rather, it requires that evolutionary outcomes in a given environmental context depend on the joint operation of multiple inheritance systems. Jablonka and Lamb point out that this is difficult to demonstrate for a variety of reasons, not least of which is that experimental studies rarely follow evolutionary response for enough generations and with sufficient attention to environmental induction for ''carry-over effects'' to be detected, let alone traced to particular kinds of epimutations. Nevertheless, if epigenetic inheritance is shown to be theoretically significant, then for any particular case of evolutionary explanation, it must be shown to be empirically insignificant in order to ignore it. That is the force of the argument offered by Jablonka and Lamb.
Darwin's 6era causa argument for the e6olutionary significance of natural selection
The argument for theoretical and empirical significance in terms of existence, competence, and responsibility of causes is not new. Indeed, it has been forcefully argued that this is the structure of Darwin's argument for the significance of natural selection in On the Origin of Species and that Darwin read of this form of argument in John Herschel's Preliminary Discourse on the Study of Natural Philosophy (1831) just before departing on the Beagle (Hodge, 1977 (Hodge, , 1989 . Herschel adopted Thomas Reid's interpretation of Newton's ''first rule of reasoning in philosophy'' which appears in book III of his Principia: ''We are to admit no more causes of natural things than such as are both true and sufficient to explain their appearances'' (Thayer, 1953) .
True causes (6era causae) are theoretically significant because they are not merely ''hypothetical'' or ''speculative''; they are known, real, existing causes. Sufficient causes are those actually responsible for the phenomena in nature we seek to explain. Darwin offered evidence that selection exists in his considerations of variation in the opening chapters (I-III) of the Origin. He argued selection is competent to produce adaptation, divergence, and speciation in the middle chapters (IV -VIII). As such, natural selection is shown to be a true cause. It is therefore theoretically significant because as a true cause -known to exist and to be competent to produce the kinds and magnitudes of effects we can observe -it must be ruled out in order to invoke an alternate explanation. It cannot be ignored as a merely hypothetical cause could be. Darwin argued further that natural selection is responsible for the production and distribution of the living and extinct species we actually see in nature in the later chapters (IX-XIII) (Hodge, 1989, Fig. 1 ). He thereby established the sufficiency or adequacy of natural selection as the causal explanation of phenomena in nature.
. . . is vaguely reminiscent
The attempt to reject or ignore the evolutionary significance of epigenetic inheritance can be understood as a rejection of its status as a true cause. Few today would doubt the existence of any of the three classes of EIS reviewed by Jablonka and Lamb. Many would question their evolutionary significance on grounds of competence. The most common type of rejection is to note that many epigenetic changes are not transmitted in the germ-line, and therefore that they can have no long-lasting effect in evolution since the one-cell bottleneck through which most organisms at least occasionally pass at reproduction will effectively eliminate many epimutations. Moreover, epigenetic changes that regulate gene expression in ontogeny must be erased or reset in germ-line cells in order to restore developmental totipotency. Jablonka and Lamb argue that germ-line transmission does occur in some cases (genomic imprinting), that it occurs more commonly in some types of organisms than others (plants), and that the diversity can be interpreted in terms of the evolution of EISs (e.g. as defense against genomic parasitism). They also point out that restoring totipotency is less stringent than restoring the exact state of the parental germ-cell: developmental totipotency is not complete invariance, so germline resetting need not completely erase epimutation in order for life to cycle properly.
More central to the issue of the form of the argument is the point that these various challenges to the evolutionary significance of epigenetic inheritance are challenges to its theoretical significance. If EISs are not theoretically significant because they are not competent to cause divergent evolutionary dynamics, they cannot be empirically significant either, and hence need not be entertained as part of any empirical explanatory program: they can be safely ignored as insignificant in principle. If, on the other hand, there is molecular, biochemical, and cytological evidence for the existence of EISs, and preliminary models show that selection on epigenetic variation could cause evolutionary change, then research programs for explaining particular empirical phenomena must rule out their empirical responsibility case by case.
Where have we seen this form of argument and counter argument before?
The case for the e6olutionary significance of group selection Just as Jablonka and Lamb argue, ''there is more to heredity than DNA,'' arguments for group selection claimed that there is more to selection than survival and reproductive success of organisms. Although there are several interpretations of what group selection means, at least one type of argument for the evolutionary significance of group selection has been shown to follow the Darwinian 6era causa argument pattern (Griesemer and Wade, 1988) . Examination of arguments against group selection have generally shown that they are arguments against its effectiveness, or ''competence'' in the sense discussed here (see Wade, 1978; Wimsatt, 1980) . Even staunch opponents of group selection tended to accept that ''group selection'' occurred in certain experimental studies (e.g. Wade, 1977) except possibly on the semantic grounds that what occurred was not group selection. But most critics concentrated either on differences between laboratory and natural conditions (see Harrison and Hastings, 1996) or on certain theoretical constraints such as the relative rates of group and individual reproduction (see Wade, 1978) , to argue that group selection could not possibly be an effective evolutionary force.
The combination of these two types of criticism obscure the form and force of the case for group selection. The argument establishes the existence of group selection in experimental laboratory populations and argues for the competence of the generated forces of group selection to produce detectable evolutionary effects in the laboratory. Thus, group selection is a true cause and must be incorporated into theoretical models in order to rule it in or out empirically in any particular explanation of evolution in nature. Group selection must be tested for because it can occur, not because it does occur often and with noteworthy consequences. Neglecting it may lead to dynamically insufficient empirical conclusions, assigning to individual selection effects that are due to group selection.
Claims that conditions in nature are different than in the laboratory (e.g., that populations in nature do not meet the stringent population-structure requirements of laboratory group selection) can be used to deny that group selection is a frequently responsible (i.e. sufficient) cause in nature. Such claims cannot be used to deny group selection's theoretical significance or the general requirement for empirical testing. Testing requires that EISs be represented in theoretical models and then shown, for each empirical application or range of parameter values, to be an ineffective force. To reject a theoretically significant cause as empirically ineffective a priori is just as mistaken as inferring that group selection is empirically significant (responsible in nature) just because it is a true (laboratory) cause.
Jablonka and Lamb argue for the theoretical significance of EISs in evolution. This, of course, is insufficient to establish empirical significance -responsibility -in nature. Jablonka and Lamb do not claim otherwise. It is nevertheless tempting to replay the group selection controversy by denying empirical significance on grounds of a lack of evidence of responsibility in nature, and take that to deny theoretical significance as well. It does not follow, however, from the fact that a cause is not responsible that it is not a true cause. More importantly, failure of apparent responsibility is insufficient reason not to pursue theoretical evolutionary models with multiple inheritance. Only a substantial effort to include EISs in theoretical models that can be used to test evolutionary competence, combined with the growing molecular evidence of their existence and nature, can support a judgment of theoretical significance, whether positive or negative.
